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NOT SO CIVIL COMMITMENT:
A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REFORM
GROUNDED IN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
MARGARET J. LEDERER†
ABSTRACT
Every year, millions of Americans struggle with serious mental
illness. Of them, thousands experience civil, or involuntary,
commitment—that is, hospitals invoke the coercive power of the state
to force these individuals into psychiatric hospitals against their will.
Whether someone requires hospitalization is a complex question of
psychology, medicine, and substantive law.
But the process of civil commitment itself is troubling. Across the
board, states fail to afford those facing civil commitment meaningful
procedural protections. Current state laws subject individuals facing
commitment to extended periods of confinement with little to no
judicial intervention. Indeed, individuals facing commitment may wait
weeks or more for a judicial hearing. And when hearings do occur, they
start and end in a matter of minutes. Within those few minutes, little
advocacy occurs: lawyers are often passive, judges are often impatient,
and respondents rarely have the chance to speak. Worse, some states
fail to provide hearings at all. In sum, civil commitment occurs in “pitch
darkness.”
Civil commitment procedure should limit, not compound, these
harms. Applying fundamentals of procedural justice, this Note
proposes three statutory reforms to increase fairness to those
experiencing civil commitment. First, this Note calls for states to hold
probable cause hearings within seventy-two hours of confinement.
Second, states should explicitly define the duties and role of counsel
within commitment proceedings. Third, states should task community

Copyright © 2023 Margaret J. Lederer.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2023; Johns Hopkins University, B.A.
2016. Thank you to Dr. Marvin Swartz, Professor Laurence Helfer, Professor Kendall Gray, my
Scholarly Writing class, and the editors of the Duke Law Journal for helpful discussions and
thoughtful comments. And a special thank you to all those who have supported me in law school
and beyond. This Note is dedicated to the attorneys and investigators of the Mental Health
Division of the Maryland Office of the Public Defender, whose tireless work sparked my interest
in this area six years ago and continues to inspire me today.

LEDERER IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

904

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

12/16/2022 10:47 AM

[Vol. 72:903

mental health boards with monitoring the commitment process to
increase compliance with the law and bring visibility to these
proceedings. Ultimately, this Note aims to promote procedural justice
for those facing civil commitment and rekindle a conversation about
how states treat those experiencing serious mental illness.

INTRODUCTION
“Did I need to be committed? Maybe. But I was not committed because
someone made that determination fairly and considerately. I was
committed because I had started a chain reaction that swallows
people.”1

On one September day, a Baltimore police officer saw Mallory
Green wandering barefoot into traffic.2 To the officer, Mallory seemed
confused and unaware of her surroundings.3 Within moments, Mallory
was nearly hit by a car.4 The officer brought Mallory to the emergency
room of a local hospital.5 When she arrived, doctors found her
agitated.6 She needed emergency medication to calm down.7 Hospital
psychiatrists then evaluated her and determined that she needed
inpatient psychiatric care.8 However, Mallory disagreed.9 And so the
hospital began the paperwork to involuntarily commit Mallory—to use
the coercive power of the state to force her to stay in the hospital
against her will.10

1. Nick Keppler, What It’s Like To Be Held in a Psych Ward Against Your Will, VICE (Nov.
30, 2017, 6:41 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/vb3web/held-in-psych-ward-against-my-will
[https://perma.cc/72FS-UN7U].
2. J.H. v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 165 A.3d 664, 671 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017). The
court refers to the respondent only by her initials, M.G. Id. at 671–74. This Note instead uses a
pseudonym, Mallory Green.
3. Id. at 671.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 672.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. (noting that Mallory “did not agree to voluntarily admit herself”).
10. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, ARTI RAI & RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 704–05 (5th ed. 2009) (defining involuntary
commitment). This Note uses the terms “involuntary commitment” and “civil commitment”
interchangeably.
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While the hospital worked to find an available bed, Mallory waited
in the emergency department.11 Ultimately, it took forty-one hours,
well over Maryland’s statutory limit of thirty hours,12 to move Mallory
out of the emergency department and into an appropriate psychiatric
facility.13 There, in a locked psychiatric unit, Mallory waited for a
chance to legally challenge her confinement.14 Under Maryland law,
Mallory could wait up to ten days for that chance.15
Finally, Mallory received a hearing on the merits of her
confinement.16 To keep Mallory in the hospital, the state needed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that Mallory had a mental
disorder, needed inpatient care, presented a danger to herself or
others, refused to admit herself voluntarily, and that no less restrictive
alternative to inpatient care existed.17 To meet that burden, the hospital
called the doctor who had been treating Mallory as its sole witness.18
The doctor testified that Mallory suffered from substance-induced
psychosis and psychotic chronic mental illness.19 The doctor explained
that Mallory was a “threat to her own safety because [she was found]

11. See J.H., 165 A.3d at 673 (discussing the hospital admission process). Unfortunately,
psychiatric boarding—the practice of housing psychiatric patients in emergency departments or
even hospital hallways as they wait for beds to become available—is common. DAVID BENDER,
NALINI PANDE & MICHAEL LUDWIG, A LITERATURE REVIEW: PSYCHIATRIC BOARDING 1
(2008), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/private/pdf/75751/PsyBdLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/
WZ22-U9T6]. For a discussion of some of the harms of psychiatric boarding, see generally
Kimberly Nordstrom, Jon S. Berlin, Sara Siris Nash, Sejal B. Shah, Naomi A. Schmelzer & Linda
L.M. Worley, Boarding of Mentally Ill Patients in Emergency Departments: American Psychiatric
Association Resource Document, 20 W.J. EMERGENCY MED. 690 (2019) and AM. COLL.
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, THE IMPACT OF BOARDING PSYCHIATRIC PATIENTS ON THE
EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT: SCOPE, IMPACT AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS (2019), https://
www.acep.org/globalassets/new-pdfs/information-and-resource-papers/the-impact-of-psychiatric
-boarders-on-the-emergency-department.pdf [https://perma.cc/28Y8-MDMB].
12. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-624(b)(4) (West 2022).
13. The amount of time Mallory spent in the emergency department was not clear at the
hearing. J.H., 165 A.3d at 673. However, the presiding judge made clear that the result would be
no different “even if [Mallory] was in [the emergency] unit for 41 hours.” Id.
14. See id. (noting that Mallory was admitted to the psychiatric unit).
15. The date of Mallory’s admission is not clear from the record on appeal. Id. at 672 n.5.
However, Maryland law permits the state to wait up to ten days before providing Mallory with a
hearing. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-632(b) (West 2022).
16. J.H., 165 A.3d at 672.
17. Id. at 674; MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-632(e)(2) (West 2022).
18. J.H., 165 A.3d at 672.
19. Id.
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incoherent, walking in the street” and that inpatient care was necessary
to stabilize her condition.20
On her side, Mallory was represented by an attorney, likely a local
public defender.21 Her attorney did not call any witnesses, and Mallory
did not testify.22 In fact, her attorney did not challenge any of the
doctor’s testimony.23 Instead, her attorney moved to have her released
on procedural grounds, noting that she had remained in the emergency
department well beyond the statutorily prescribed time limit.24 Further,
her attorney argued, there was no evidence that she was given the
required notice of her status as an involuntary patient or of this
hearing.25 The presiding judge agreed, acknowledging that the
“necessary procedures ha[d] not been shown to have been followed”
and, as a result, Mallory was “entitled to be discharged.”26
But Mallory was not discharged.27 The judge “[did not] think it
would be good for either the patient or the hospital to discharge her.”28
And so the judge ordered Mallory to be involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric hospital,29 where Mallory could remain for as long as six
months.30

20. Id. Little more is known about Mallory. The appellate record does not reveal whether
Mallory had a family or support system outside the hospital. See id. at 671–74 (discussing only
Mallory’s psychiatric symptoms).
21. Id. at 672; see MD. DEP’T OF HEALTH, BEHAV. HEALTH ADMIN., INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT STAKEHOLDERS’ WORKGROUP REPORT 6 (2021) [hereinafter WORKGROUP
REPORT], https://health.maryland.gov/bha/Documents/Involuntary%20Commitment%20Stake
holders.Final%20report%208.11.21.docx.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB9Z-HVZ2] (noting that of the
9,612 total involuntary commitment proceedings in Maryland in 2020, only one person retained
private counsel).
22. J.H., 165 A.3d at 672.
23. See id. (noting that Mallory’s attorney attacked only the procedural failures).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 672–73.
27. Id. at 673.
28. Id.
29. Before doing so, the hospital warned that Mallory “clearly [was] not in any condition to
leave the hospital at this time.” Id. In response, the presiding judge determined that the “only
remedy that [the judge] could grant would be to allow the Hospital to reopen their case and
present [additional] evidence.” Id. That additional testimony failed to clarify exactly how long
Mallory had spent in the emergency department. Id. Nevertheless, the judge held that these
procedural violations were not prejudicial and did not require release. Id.
30. Maryland law does not specify how long a commitment order may last, but advocacy
groups warn involuntary commitment in Maryland may last as long as six months. NAT’L ALL. ON
MENTAL ILLNESS MD., WHAT TO DO IN A PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS IN MARYLAND 4 (2010)
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Mallory’s story is troubling, but not necessarily because of its
outcome. Whether or not Mallory required hospitalization is a complex
question of psychology and substantive law. Rather, Mallory’s story is
troubling because of the lack of procedural justice she received.
Mallory spent as many as ten days confined in a locked psychiatric unit,
waiting for an opportunity to legally challenge her confinement. And
when that opportunity came, Mallory sat, silently, as she heard the
presiding judge acknowledge that the state failed to follow the
procedural process she was owed.
Mallory is not alone. She is one of the millions of Americans who
struggle with serious mental illness.31 And she is one of the thousands
who experience civil commitment each year.32 Still more troublesome,
Mallory received more procedural process than most. Unfortunately,
the majority of individuals facing civil commitment receive hearings
that last only minutes.33 Within those precious minutes, little advocacy
occurs: lawyers are often passive, judges are often impatient, and
respondents like Mallory rarely have the chance to speak.34 Indeed,
commitment hearings “tend to be brief and non-adversarial episodes
in which judges appear to ‘rubber stamp’ the recommendations of
[hereinafter MARYLAND PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS], http://namimd.org/uploaded_files/3/What_to_
do_in_a_Psychiatric_Crisis_PDF_for_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HND8-ZXGW].
31. Mental Health by the Numbers, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://www.nami.org/
mhstats [https://perma.cc/3LX3-A3RL], (last updated June 2022). The National Institute of
Mental Health defines a serious mental illness as one that results in “serious functional
impairment, which substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life activities.” Mental
Illness, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mentalillness [https://perma.cc/8FKG-G97U], (last updated Jan. 2022).
32. See Nathaniel P. Morris, Detention Without Data: Public Tracking of Civil Commitment,
71 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 741, 741 (2020) (highlighting the lack of data on the frequency of civil
commitment in the United States but noting that researchers estimated that “more than one
million emergency psychiatric detentions” took place annually between 2013 and 2015). In
Maryland alone, nearly ten thousand civil commitment hearings took place in 2020. WORKGROUP
REPORT, supra note 21.
33. Richard J. Bonnie, Reforming Civil Commitment: Serving Consumers’ Needs While
Protecting Their Rights, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 3, 4 (2006); see also Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979) (referencing three studies that calculated the average length of a
commitment hearing to be between three and ten minutes); Michael L. Perlin, ‘Who Will Judge
the Many When the Game Is Through?’: Considering the Profound Differences Between Mental
Health Courts and ‘Traditional’ Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
937, 938–39 (2018) [hereinafter Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many] (noting that hearings continue
to be conducted in a matter of minutes).
34. Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33; William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags
the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil
Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 259, 287 (2010).
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clinical expert witnesses.”35 Worse still, some individuals are
involuntarily committed without any hearing at all.36 Taken together,
one scholar concluded that civil commitment occurs in “pitch
darkness.”37
Although these hearings—if they occur at all—may only last
minutes, their ramifications are striking. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that “civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty.”38 Involuntarily
committed individuals are not only “deprived of their physical liberty,
they are . . . deprived of friends, family, and community.”39 They are
also forced to live in psychiatric hospitals “under the continuous and
detailed control of strangers.”40 Beyond the loss of liberty and
autonomy, “involuntary commitment to a mental hospital . . . can
engender adverse social consequences.”41 Hospitalized individuals “are
stigmatized as sick and abnormal during confinement and . . . even
after release.”42
Civil commitment procedure should limit, not compound, these
harms. Procedural justice stands for the idea that “people’s evaluations
of the resolution of a dispute . . . are influenced more by their
perception of the fairness of the process employed than by their belief
regarding whether the ‘right’ outcome” was achieved.43 Accordingly,
“when the people affected by a decision-making process perceive the
process to be just, they are much more likely to accept the outcomes of

35. BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE MODEL 143
(2005) [hereinafter WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT].
36. See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.
37. Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33, at 939.
38. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
39. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 626 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
40. Id.
41. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26.
42. Parham, 442 U.S. at 626–27 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Thomas L. Hafemeister, Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, Forging Links and
Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and Procedural Justice To Better Respond
to Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 200 (2012) (citing Professor
Tom Tyler’s research). See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (presenting “a field of social psychology
that . . . views people as more interested in issues of process than issues of outcome” and that
“addresses the way in which their evaluations of experiences and relationships are influenced by
the form of social interaction” (emphasis omitted)).
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the process, even when the outcomes are adverse.”44 Whether someone
perceives a process to be just depends on key “process values [such] as
participation, dignity, and trust.”45 Like anyone else, individuals with
mental illness are affected by these values,46 and they, too, tend not to
believe a procedure was fair when no one heard their voice or took
them seriously.47
For over forty years, scholars and advocacy groups alike have
recognized the problems in the civil commitment system and called for
reform.48 Nevertheless, “the perfunctory nature of civil commitment
remains today.”49 This Note proposes three statutory reforms to
enhance procedural justice in the commitment process and increase
fairness to those experiencing it. First, states should limit the amount
of time people like Mallory may wait for judicial intervention by
holding a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of
emergency detention. Second, states should delineate the duties and
role of counsel within commitment proceedings, defining the level of
preparation and advocacy required. Third, states should task
community mental health boards with monitoring the civil

44. Hafemeister et al., supra note 43 (quoting Michael M. O’Hear, Explaining Sentences, 36
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 478 (2009)).
45. Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33, at 955.
46. Id.
47. Professors Michele Cascardi, Norman Poythress, and Alicia Hall summarized this
research, explaining that psychiatric “patients are sensitive to and able to distinguish procedural
as well as distributive justice issues.” Michele Cascardi, Norman G. Poythress & Alicia Hall,
Procedural Justice in the Context of Civil Commitment: An Analogue Study, 18 BEHAV. SCIS. & L.
731, 732 (2000) (quoting Jack Susman, Resolving Hospital Conflicts: A Study on Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107, 112 (1994)). In the context of disputes over drug
treatment, “patients who felt that their argument had been listened to and given serious
consideration were more likely to feel that the procedure was fair than were those who felt that
they had not been listened to or taken seriously.” Id. at 733.
48. See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A System
in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 368 (1983) (calling the then-current commitment system
“outmoded and unresponsive to the needs of the mentally ill in contemporary society”); Clifford
D. Stromberg & Alan A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 276–79 (1983) (proposing a model law to address a “second-generation”
of problems arising from deinstitutionalization); Agnes B. Hatfield, The National Alliance for the
Mentally Ill: The Meaning of a Movement, 15 INT’L J. MENTAL HEALTH 79, 79, 88 (1987) (noting
that advocating for “changes in involuntary commitment laws” was one of the original goals of
NAMI state affiliates at their founding in 1979); Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts., Guidelines for
Involuntary Civil Commitment, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 409, 409 (1986)
[hereinafter State Courts Guidelines] (proposing “practical measures for improving the civil
commitment process within the confines of existing statutory frameworks”).
49. Brooks, supra note 34, at 285.
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commitment process to increase compliance with the law and bring
visibility to these proceedings.
This Note does not call for an overhaul of states’ statutory schemes
or attempt to set forth a comprehensive model act. Rather, it surveys
existing state practices to draw inspiration for three targeted statutory
reforms. While not a panacea, statutory reform is a first—and
necessary—step to improving the process of civil commitment.50
This Note will proceed in four parts. Part I summarizes the
development of civil commitment within the United States and
explains the bare-bones constitutional framework with which states
must comply. Part II discusses the procedural mechanics of civil
commitment and how that process varies across states. This Part
focuses on civil commitment in the emergency context, as it is the
“easiest way to get a person hospitalized against his or her will and to
forego the procedural safeguards encountered in other commitment
routes.”51 Part III identifies three flaws in current commitment
procedure: the failure to provide timely hearings, the often inadequate
representation of counsel, and the lack of compliance with existing law.
Part IV makes the case for reform.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CIVIL COMMITMENT PRACTICE
While awareness of mental illness has grown in recent years,52
mental illness is not new. On the contrary, records of mental illness
date back over 2,500 years.53 And for as long as people have struggled
50. New Report Card of State Psychiatric Treatment Laws Finds Many States Have Outdated
or Vague Rules, TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR. (Sept. 22, 2020) [hereinafter New Report Card],
https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/fixing-the-system/features-and-news/4323-new-report
-card-of-state-psychiatric-treatment-laws-finds-many-states-have-outdated-or-vague-rules
[https://perma.cc/75NT-WVVU].
51. Richard Van Duizend, Bradley D. McGraw & Ingo Keilitz, An Overview of State
Involuntary Civil Commitment Statutes, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 329
(1984).
52. See Mental Health Awareness Month, NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, https://
www.nami.org/Get-Involved/Awareness-Events/Mental-Health-Awareness-Month [https://per
ma.cc/4MXC-7S4B] (recognizing the “national movement to raise awareness about mental
health” in part through mental health awareness month); Michele Nealon, The Pandemic
Accelerant: How COVID-19 Advanced Our Mental Health Priorities, U.N. CHRON. (Oct. 10,
2021), https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/pandemic-accelerant-how-covid-19-advanced-our-me
ntal-health-priorities [https://perma.cc/M9N4-G62B] (“COVID-19 . . . accelerated positive momentum
in our communities to raise awareness about [mental health] issues . . . .”).
53. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL § 3-2.1 (3d ed. 2019) (noting that “references to the allocation of legal
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with mental illness, societies have struggled with how best to care for
them.54 This Part explains how modern civil commitment law reached
its current form and outlines its current constitutional framework.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed a handful of cases
regarding due process, the Court has not specified the procedural
protections to which Mallory and those like her are entitled. As a
result, states largely design their own civil commitment systems.
A. The Roots of American Civil Commitment
In the United States, the practice of involuntary commitment
dates back to the Founding era.55 In that period, states classified civil
commitment as a medical process, placing the decision to commit in
the hands of psychiatrists with little, if any, judicial oversight.56 Indeed,
to involuntarily commit someone, states required little more than “a
few words hastily scribbled upon a chance scrap of paper.”57 Doctors
were convinced that in order to provide effective treatment, the
individual needed to be isolated as rapidly and effectively as possible.58
As a result, states could commit an individual with “the greatest of
ease” and without any “legislative safeguards to protect the personal
liberty of the supposedly mentally ill person.”59 Up until the midtwentieth century, states “largely dispensed with [due process] on the
ground that the goal of commitment was therapy, not punishment.”60
At the same time, the number of state psychiatric institutions—
and residents within them—increased.61 Conditions within each
responsibility for the care and maintenance” of individuals with mental illness extends nearly 2500
years); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 6 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M. McIntyre,
Jr. eds., 1961) (discussing how “[o]ne of the earliest legal references to the mentally disabled is
contained in the Twelve Tables of Rome, which were promulgated in 449 B.C.”).
54. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 53.
55. Id. § 3-2.2 (discussing treatment of individuals with mental illness in colonial America).
56. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 35, at 4.
57. THOMAS G. MORTON, THE HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL, 1751–1895
(Philadelphia, Times Printing House rev. ed. 1897) (1895), reprinted in Thomas G. Morton, The
Pennsylvania Hospital: Its Founding and Functions, in THE AGE OF MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF
INVOLUNTARY MENTAL HOSPITALIZATION PRESENTED IN SELECTED TEXTS 12, 13 (Thomas S.
Szasz ed., 1973).
58. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 53, § 3-2.2.
59. Id. (quoting ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF
THEIR CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 419 (2d ed. 1949)).
60. Stromberg & Stone, supra note 48, at 275.
61. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 53, § 3-2.2 (noting that “institutions proliferated”
during the nineteenth century).
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institution depended purely on the individual in charge.62 As the
number of institutions continued to grow, institutional neglect
“became the rule rather than the exception.”63 Eventually, the media
began to expose the “abysmal conditions” in the “overcrowded,
underfunded, and understaffed” state psychiatric facilities.64
By the 1960s, public perception of mental illness—and specifically
psychiatric hospitals—began to change.65 President John F. Kennedy
proclaimed that “abandonment of the mentally ill . . . to the grim
mercy of custodial institutions too often inflicts on them . . . a needless
cruelty.”66 Congress passed funding bills designed to increase access to
community care—treatment on an outpatient basis—rather than
institutional care.67 And perhaps most importantly, the first
psychotropic medications became readily available in the United
States.68
Taken together, these factors led to a mass deinstitutionalization
within the United States, where the number of people residing in
psychiatric hospitals—voluntarily or otherwise—declined over 75
percent by 1980.69 As a result, institutions were closed, buildings
destroyed, and patient beds eliminated.70 But deinstitutionalization did
not prove to be a panacea: while the daily population of people living
in psychiatric facilities decreased, hospital admission rates soared.71

62. Myers, supra note 48, at 371.
63. Id. at 373.
64. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 35, at 141; e.g., Albert Q. Maisel, Bedlam 1946:
Most U.S. Mental Hospitals Are a Shame and a Disgrace, LIFE, May 6, 1946, at 102 (exposing
conditions in mental hospitals in the United States).
65. Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the
Deinstitutionalization of Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 53, 68–71 (2011)
(discussing the evolving public perception of mental illness and mental hospitals).
66. Myers, supra note 48, at 374 (citing PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: JOHN F.
KENNEDY 1963, at 14 (1964)).
67. Id. at 391.
68. SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 10, at 706.
69. See Myers, supra note 48, at 391 (“The number of residents in state and county mental
hospitals declined from 559,000 in 1955 to approximately 138,000 in 1980.”).
70. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF CHANGE 50 (1994). For a descriptive analysis of the deinstitutionalization movement,
see generally Christopher J. Smith & Robert Q. Hanham, Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally
Ill: A Time Path Analysis of the American States, 1955–1975, 15 SOC. SCI. & MED. 361 (1981).
71. SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 10, at 705 (noting that during the period of
deinstitutionalization, “the annual admission rate for public mental hospitals almost doubled,
from 185,597 to 390,000”).
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Nevertheless, due in large part to the lack of community resources and
adequate public funding for state hospitals,72 the number of available
beds for people like Mallory has continued to shrink.73
B. The Constitutional Framework
As public outrage over the conditions in state psychiatric hospitals
grew and deinstitutionalization began to gain momentum, legal
activists of the civil rights era took note. The civil rights movement had
shaped a new generation of lawyers determined to enhance protections
for individual and minority rights.74 By the 1970s, these activists had set
their sights on the rights of those with mental illness and specifically
the rights of individuals who had been civilly committed.75
In response, a flurry of advocacy and litigation regarding the rights
of people with mental illness sprouted across the country.76 A handful
of these cases eventually reached the Supreme Court. When first
addressing the issue in 1972, the Court reflected that “[c]onsidering the
number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the
substantive constitutional limitations on [the commitment] power have
not been more frequently litigated.”77 While declining to address
“these broad questions,” the Court acknowledged that, “[a]t the least,
due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.”78

72. Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment – The American Experience,
43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY & RELATED SCI. 209, 216 (2006).
73. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., GOING, GOING, GONE: TRENDS AND CONSEQUENCES
OF ELIMINATING STATE PSYCHIATRIC BEDS, 2016, at 1–2 (2016), https://www.treatment
advocacycenter.org/storage/documents/going-going-gone.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPX8-8AAJ]. The
situation is even more dire “[f]or patients without private insurance or financial resources”
because “waiting lists abound for underfunded public mental health resources in the community,
as well as for the rare long-term inpatient beds left in the dwindling number of state hospitals.”
Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 72.
74. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 35, at 141.
75. Id.; see also State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 415 (noting that the “plight of
mental patients became a civil rights issue”); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: A Call for a Stricter Test in Civil Commitments, 27 J. LEGAL PROF. 37, 38
(2003) (“[In] the 1960s, . . . a group of lawyers devoted themselves to championing the civil rights
of minority groups including people with mental disabilities.”).
76. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 35, at 141.
77. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972) (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 737–38.
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A few years later, in O’Connor v. Donaldson,79 the Court clarified
the substantive standards of commitment.80 Specifically, states may not
detain individuals with mental illness when “they are dangerous to no
one and can live safely in freedom.”81 Kenneth Donaldson had spent
nearly fifteen years involuntarily confined within a Florida psychiatric
hospital.82 But throughout the entirety of his fifteen-year detention, the
state had never demonstrated that Mr. Donaldson posed a danger to
others.83 The Court agreed that Mr. Donaldson’s confinement violated
his constitutional right to liberty.84 The Court warned that “[m]ere
public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.”85 Nevertheless, given the
narrow issue presented, the Court managed to once again duck the
broader constitutional questions of “whether, when, or by what
procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State.”86
In the nearly fifty years since Donaldson, the Court has offered
little guidance. The Court has only specified the minimum burden of
proof that states must meet in a civil commitment hearing.87 While
states are free to require a higher burden, the Court has held that states
must show that an individual meets the substantive criteria for
commitment by at least clear and convincing evidence.88 Beyond this,
the Court has remained silent on the procedural rights of those facing
involuntary commitment.89

79. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
80. Id. at 576.
81. Id. at 575.
82. Id. at 564.
83. Id. at 568.
84. Id. at 576.
85. Id. at 575.
86. See id. at 573–74 (recognizing that “[the jury’s] verdict, based on abundant evidence,
makes the issue before the Court a narrow one” and as a result “[w]e need not decide whether,
when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be confined by the State on any of the
grounds which, under contemporary statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary
confinement of such a person”).
87. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
88. Id.
89. In fact, the Court has not even referenced civil commitment in the body of a majority
opinion since 2010. See generally United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010) (evaluating the
constitutionality of the civil commitment of sexually dangerous individuals).

LEDERER IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2023]

NOT SO CIVIL COMMITMENT

12/16/2022 10:47 AM

915

II. CHOOSE YOUR OWN ADVENTURE: CIVIL COMMITMENT ACROSS
THE STATES
With this silence, the mantle has been passed to the states. As long
as states meet the constitutional threshold, each state may set its own
civil commitment procedures.90 As a result, both “[t]he substantive
limitations on the exercise of [the commitment] power and the
procedures for invoking it vary drastically among the [s]tates.”91 The
Court called this feature “the essence of federalism.”92 However,
mental health advocates view this variation less favorably, referring to
the U.S. strategy for serious mental illness as “effectively running 50
different experiments, with no two states taking the same approach.”93
This Part surveys modern civil commitment procedure to familiarize
the reader with the general process of civil commitment and illustrate
the statutory diversity across the states.
A. Initiating Commitment
In theory, anyone—a troubled parent, a worried neighbor, a
concerned therapist, or even an anxious friend—may initiate civil

90. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 433 (noting that “determination of the precise burden equal
to or greater than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard which we hold is required to meet due
process guarantees is a matter of state law which we leave to the [state supreme court]”); Anfang
& Appelbaum, supra note 72, at 210 (“Although federal court decisions and national health and
welfare programs have had some impact on commitment practices, civil commitment laws and
regulations are devised by each state . . . .”).
91. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736–37 (1972).
92. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431. To be sure, one of the hallmarks of a federalist system is the
ability of states to serve as laboratories of democracy, trying “novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This Note does not set out to criticize this system. In
fact, it reaps the benefits of the statutory diversity that federalism allows. This Note surveys the
diversity across the states, highlighting those states that have made changes to enhance procedural
justice and urging the others to follow suit. See generally ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC
LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES (2007) (discussing policy
diffusion across the states). But see, e.g., Michael Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126
YALE L.J. 636, 645 (2017) (arguing that “experimentation and the information it produces cannot
be taken as an unmitigated good”).
93. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., GRADING THE STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S.
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT LAWS 4 (2020) [hereinafter GRADING THE STATES], https://
www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/grading-the-states.pdf [https://perma.cc/
XXV4-SP5D].
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commitment proceedings by filing a petition.94 In that scenario, the
appropriate state court or officer would review the petition for merit
while the respondent, the subject of the petition, remains at liberty.95
In practice, however, civil commitment is often triggered by an
alternate means: emergency detention.96 Every state allows law
enforcement to immediately detain individuals whom they have reason
to believe are mentally ill and a danger to either themselves or others.97
Due to the exigent circumstances, this process lacks many, if not all, of
the judicial or administrative review mechanisms that commitment by
petition requires.98 Moreover, emergency detention is the
“predominant commitment route in many states, especially in major
cities,” often employed “even when no emergency actually exists.”99
In this scenario, commitment tends to begin with a panicked call
to a crisis unit or 911, summoning responders to the scene.100 Upon

94. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-614(a) (West 2022) (allowing a petition
to be filed by “any person who has a legitimate interest in the welfare of the individual”); ALA.
CODE § 22-52-1.2(a) (2022) (allowing “any person” to file an involuntary commitment petition).
95. See Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 51 (explaining that in non-emergency
commitment, the respondent may be detained only after judicial review). The appropriate court
differs from state to state. See infra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.
96. Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 51; see also MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO MENTAL HEALTH LAW § 4.7.4 (2021) (relying on this research
to conclude that emergency commitment has become a “standard means of institutionalization”).
This Note uses the terms “emergency detention” and “emergency confinement” interchangeably.
97. Leslie C. Hedman, John Petrila, William H. Fisher, Jeffrey W. Swanson, Deirdre A.
Dingman & Scott Burris, State Laws on Emergency Holds for Mental Health Stabilization, 67
PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 529, 530 (2016). Five states—Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, and
New York—do not even require that the danger must be due to mental illness. Id. at 531, 532
tbl.3; see also Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 51 (“Most state statutes specifically
allow apprehension and emergency detention of persons for whom delay would be
inappropriate.” (emphasis omitted)).
98. Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 51.
99. Id.; see also State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 427 (“For the most part, persons
become involuntary patients by means of ‘emergency’ commitments resulting from
apprehensions by police or by simply appearing on the doorstep of a mental health facility.”).
100. MARYLAND PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS, supra note 30, at 2; NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS
VA., GUIDE TO PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS AND CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS IN VIRGINIA 3 (2016),
https://namivirginia.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/2016/03/GuidetoPsychiatricCrisisandCivil
CommitmentProcessforWebGuid-justlawscriteria2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDX3-TS66]; TEX.
YOUNG LAWS. ASS’N, COMMITTED TO HEALING: INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEDURES 5
(2008), https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Free_Legal_Information2&Temp
late=/CC/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=30801 [https://perma.cc/K6JD-NM66]; see also Leslie
Allen, Short-Term Emergency Commitment Laws Require Police To Assess Symptoms of Mental
Illness, BILL OF HEALTH (Nov. 25, 2014), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2014/11/25/
short-term-emergency-commitment-laws-require-police-to-assess-symptoms-of-mental-illness
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arrival, officers observe the individual and decide if a psychiatric
evaluation is necessary.101 If they believe it is, officers will detain the
individual and bring them to a local hospital102—often using the back
of their squad cars as transportation.103
At the hospital, treatment staff examine and evaluate the
individual.104 If the examiner concludes that the individual requires
hospitalization and they refuse admission, the hospital may detain
them for a statutorily specified amount of time.105 Once this emergency
hold has begun, the hospital must make a choice: release the individual
or continue to civil commitment proceedings.106
B. Judicial Hearings
States vest the authority to preside over civil commitment cases in
various bodies. In some states, the probate court has jurisdiction over
civil commitment.107 In others, the general state court hears civil
commitment cases.108 However, a small minority of states has delegated

[https://perma.cc/H4X9-HVX6] (discussing a dataset demonstrating that “[p]olice officers serve
as first responders for mental health crisis treatment by legislation in nearly every state”). Officers
may also stumble upon the individual without a call, like the officer who found Mallory wandering
into traffic. J.H. v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 165 A.3d 664, 671 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017).
101. TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., ROAD RUNNERS: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN TRANSPORTING INDIVIDUALS WITH SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, A NATIONAL
SURVEY 4 (2019) [hereinafter ROAD RUNNERS], https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/stor
age/documents/Road-Runners.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9YJ-4NKZ].
102. MARYLAND PSYCHIATRIC CRISIS, supra note 30, at 2; ROAD RUNNERS, supra note 101.
103. See ROAD RUNNERS, supra note 101, at 19 (“[P]eople experiencing a psychiatric crisis
are frequently transported in the same manner as individuals who have committed a crime.”).
104. Id. at 4; see also Van Duizend, McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 51, at 332 (discussing
prehearing examination procedures).
105. ROAD RUNNERS, supra note 101. The length of an emergency hold varies by state.
Hedman et al., supra note 97, at 528 tbl.1. However, most states cap their holds at seventy-two
hours. Id.
106. At any point during hospitalization, an individual may consent to inpatient treatment. In
that case, there is no longer a need for civil commitment. Similarly, the treatment team may decide
that the respondent no longer requires involuntarily commitment and release the individual.
107. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-497(a) (2021) (“The jurisdiction of the commitment of a
person with psychiatric disabilities shall be vested in the . . . court of probate . . . .”); MO. REV.
STAT. § 632.410 (2022) (“Venue . . . shall be in the court having probate jurisdiction . . . .”); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(A) (West 2022) (“[H]earings shall be conducted by a judge of the
probate court . . . .”).
108. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5008(a) (2022) (instructing hospitals to file petitions
for commitment with the superior court or family court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2954(a) (2022)
(empowering district courts to issue ex parte emergency custody orders); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 7612(b) (West 2022) (assigning jurisdiction to the family division of the local superior court).
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this responsibility to nonjudicial bodies.109 For example, the judge in
Mallory’s case was actually an administrative law judge appointed to
hear a range of administrative hearings.110 As another example, West
Virginia authorizes the chief judge to “appoint a competent
attorney . . . to serve as mental hygiene commissioner[] to preside over
involuntary hospitalization hearings.”111
No matter who hears the case, every state provides individuals like
Mallory the opportunity for a hearing. But not all states provide
hearings automatically. On the contrary, some states require the
respondent to submit a request in writing.112 For example, New York
provides hearings only to those individuals who ask for them—or those
with attorneys or family members who ask for them.113 Otherwise,
confinement continues unchallenged and without judicial oversight.
Likewise, in Colorado, an individual cannot obtain a hearing unless
they or their attorney request one.114 Absent a request, Colorado may
detain an individual without a hearing for up to six months.115 Only at
that point must the respondent receive a hearing.116
Fortunately, the vast majority of states provide hearings as of
right.117 That is, absent any waiver or extension, the individual must

109. E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-924 (2022) (requiring commitment hearings to be held by a
mental health board); 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 7109(a) (West 2022) (allowing
proceedings to be conducted by a “mental health review officer”).
110. See J.H. v. Prince George’s Hosp. Ctr., 165 A.3d 664, 666 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2017)
(“Appellant was afforded a hearing before an administrative law judge . . . .”).
111. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-10(a) (2022).
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-107(6) (2022); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-498(g) (2021); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a)(2) (McKinney 1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 5-415(B) (West
2022).
113. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a)(2) (McKinney 1985).
114. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-107(6) (2022) (allowing respondent to “file a written request”
for judicial intervention).
115. See id. § 27-65-109(5) (requiring a hearing should the state seek to extend detention
beyond six months).
116. Id.
117. ALA. CODE § 22-52-8 (2022); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(a) (2022); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36-535 (2022); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-210 (2022); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5256
(West 2022); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-498 (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5009 (2022); D.C.
CODE § 21-545 (2022); FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2022); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-62 (2022); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 334-60.5 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 66-326 (2022); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-611 (2014); IND.
CODE § 12-26-5-9 (2022); IOWA CODE § 229.11 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2959(b) (2022); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.051 (West 2022); LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(A) (2022); ME. STAT. tit. 34B, § 3864 (2022); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-632 (West 2022); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
123, § 7(c) (2022); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1452 (2022); MINN. STAT. § 253B.08 (2022); MISS.
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receive a hearing within a statutorily set period. But the amount of time
individuals wait for these hearings varies dramatically. If someone is
detained in an emergency situation in, for example, Minnesota, the
state must hold a hearing within seventy-two hours, excluding
weekends and holidays.118 But were the same series of events to occur
in Mississippi, the state may wait seven days to hold a hearing.119 Many
states fall near Mississippi, requiring a hearing within five to seven days
of detention, excluding weekends and holidays.120 But some states lag
behind even a seven day hearing requirement. In Maryland, people like
Mallory may have to wait up to ten days.121 And in both Rhode Island122
and South Carolina,123 they can wait up to fifteen days—over two
weeks.
Some states have increased judicial involvement in the civil
commitment process by holding two hearings: first, a preliminary or

CODE ANN. § 41-21-71 (2022); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.335(1) (2022); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21120 (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-923 (2022); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.220 (2021); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.12 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 431-11 (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268(a) (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-26(2)
(2021); OHIO REV. § 5122.141 (West 2022); OR. REV. STAT. §426.237(4)(b) (2021); 50 PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. § 7303(b) (West 2022); CODE ANN. 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8(d) (2022);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-410 (2022); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-10-5 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 33-6-413 (2021); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.005 (2022); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15631 (West 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7615 (West 2022); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-814 (2022);
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.170 (2022); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-2(f) (2022); WIS. STAT. § 51.20 (2022);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-109.
118. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(7)(a) (2022). Other states that hold hearings within seventy-two
hours include Alaska (ALASKA § 47.30.715 (2022)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47210(a)(3) (2022)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31 (2010)), Texas (TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.005(b) (2022)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-814(A) (2022)),
Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(a) (2022)), and Wyoming (WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-109(c)
(2022)).
119. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-71 (2022).
120. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 426.095(2) (2021) (requiring a hearing within five judicial days
of initial detention); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.141(B) (West 2022) (same); IOWA CODE
§ 229.11 (2018) (same); ALA. CODE § 22-52-8 (2022) (requiring a probable cause hearing within
seven days); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-21-71 (2022) (requiring a hearing within seven days after a
petition is filed); see also Stromberg & Stone, supra note 48, at 323 (recognizing a trend among
states of providing a hearing within five to seven days after admission).
121. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-632(b) (West 2022).
122. See 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-7(f)–(g) (2022) (allowing up to ten days before patient
must be certified); id. § 40.1-5-8(d)(1) (2022) (allowing up to five days between certification and
preliminary hearing).
123. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-410 (2022) (requiring a hearing to be held within fifteen
days of admission).
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probable cause hearing and second, a full hearing on the merits.124 In a
preliminary hearing, the presiding official assesses whether the petition
demonstrates sufficient probable cause to continue commitment until
a full hearing can be held. Wisconsin is one such example. In
Wisconsin, the court must hold a probable cause hearing within
seventy-two hours after detention begins.125 At this hearing, the
detained individual still receives procedural protections such as the
assistance of counsel, but the state need only show probable cause to
continue detention.126 If the state meets its burden, the court will then
schedule a full hearing to be held within fourteen days from the date of
initial confinement.127 At this second hearing, the state must then
establish that the individual meets the criteria for commitment by a
higher burden of proof—at minimum, by clear and convincing
evidence.128
Some states do not go as far as holding two distinct hearings, like
Wisconsin does. Instead of a probable cause hearing, some states
require only a probable cause review.129 For example, New Jersey
requires that hospitals submit to the court a clinical certificate that
explains the basis for detention.130 Upon receipt, the court reviews for
probable cause.131 If the court finds probable cause, the court may
authorize temporary detention until a hearing is held.132 In New Jersey,
someone in Mallory’s shoes may wait up to twenty days for a hearing.133

124. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-52-8 (2022); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5009 (2022); IND. CODE
§ 12-26-5-9 (2022); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.051 (West 2022); 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
§ 7303 (West 2022); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-413 (2021); WIS. STAT. § 51.20 (2022).
125. WIS. STAT. § 51.20(7)(a) (2022). At the request of the individual facing commitment or
counsel, the hearing may be postponed for a maximum of seven days beyond the date of initial
confinement. Id. The state, however, may not request a postponement. See id. (providing for
postponement only by respondent).
126. Id. § 51.20(7)(c).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 51.20(13)(e); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-410(3) (requiring probate court review “to determine if
probable cause exists to continue emergency detention”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.10(f) (West
2014) (demanding probable cause review); IOWA CODE § 229.22(b) (2022) (instructing magistrate
to review for probable cause); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-62(a) (2022) (instructing court to review
petitions for “reasonable cause”).
130. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.10(a)(1) (West 2014).
131. Id. § 30:4-27.10(f).
132. Id. § 30:4-27.10(g).
133. Id. § 30:4-27.12.
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For both preliminary and full merits hearings, states enjoy broad
power to set their own procedural rules. As a result, hearings operate
differently in each state. For instance, the fact finder at civil
commitment hearings varies. While many states leave the fact-finding
to the presiding judge or officer, at least fourteen states allow
respondents to elect a jury trial.134 In addition, while some states allow
for a public hearing should the respondent desire one, many default to
a closed hearing, allowing only parties and witnesses.135 Similarly, many
states encourage flexibility with hearing location, often allowing the
hearing to be held at the detaining facility or another place “not likely
to have a harmful effect on the individual’s health or well-being.”136
Once a full hearing has been held, the fact-finder must decide
whether the individual meets the state’s criteria for involuntary
commitment.137 If the state has met its burden, the court will then order
a period of commitment. These periods vary, from as little as thirty
days138 to as long as six months.139

134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-111(1) (2022); D.C. CODE § 21-544 (2022); 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3-802 (2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2960(a)(1) (2022); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
202A.076(2) (West 2022); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1458 (2022); MO. REV. STAT. § 632.350
(2022); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-125 (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-12(B) (West 2009); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 43A, § 5-411(3) (West 2022); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.032 (2022); WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.05.240(6) (2022); WIS. STAT. § 51.20(2)(b) (2022); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10110(g) (2022).
135. E.g., IOWA CODE § 229.12(2) (2018) (“All persons not necessary for the conduct of the
proceeding shall be excluded . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2959(c) (2022) (“All persons not
necessary for the conduct of the proceedings may be excluded.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 202A.076(1) (West 2022) (“The court may exclude all persons not necessary for the conduct of
the hearing.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(D) (2022) (noting the hearing will be closed); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-268(h) (2021) (“The hearing shall be closed to the public unless the respondent
requests otherwise.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-110(h) (2022) (“All persons not necessary to
protect the rights of the parties shall be excluded from the hearing.”).
136. IND. CODE § 12-26-6-5 (2022); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-800(a) (2015) (“[H]earings
shall be held in the mental health facility where the respondent is hospitalized.”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 330.1456 (2022) (“[T]he court shall convene hearings in a hospital.”); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 202A.076(2) (West 2022) (“The hearing may be held by the court . . . at a hospital.”); OR.
REV. STAT. § 426.095(1) (2021) (same); 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-8 (2022) (same).
137. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(C)(1) (2022).
139. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 123, § 8(d) (2022). These periods can be even longer if the state is
seeking to renew a commitment order rather than initiate commitment. See id. (allowing the state
to request a one year commitment at renewal hearing).
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C. Appointment of Counsel
While hearing requirements may differ, every state provides for
the assistance of counsel in civil commitment hearings.140 But that
assistance takes different forms in different states. While respondents
are free to retain their own attorneys, frequently they rely on the
assistance of the state’s appointed counsel.141 Many states delegate this
work to the local public defender’s office.142 But some states are careful
to appoint attorneys with experience representing people with mental
illness.143 For example, Rhode Island provides respondents with
“mental health advocates” to act as their counsel.144 Others, while not
going so far as to require the court to appoint attorneys from a specific
organization, explicitly require attorneys of requisite competency.145
For example, Oregon requires that the court appoint “suitable legal
counsel possessing skills and experience commensurate with the nature
of the allegations and complexity of the case.”146 However, many states
take less care, stating only that the court shall appoint an attorney,147
140. Michael Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental
Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 44 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, Fatal Assumption].
141. See supra note 21.
142. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(3); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:23 (1998); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 53-21-116 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 394.467(4) (2022).
143. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-625(c)(1) (West 2022) (requiring notice of
involuntary admission to the Mental Health Division of the local public defender); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 122C-270(a) (2006) (appointing special mental health counsel from the Office of Indigent
Defense Services); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 1985) (requiring notice of
involuntary admission to the Mental Hygiene Legal Service); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-4-B (West
2007) (“When appointing counsel, the court shall give preference to nonprofit organizations
offering representation to persons with a mental illness . . . .”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(B) (2022)
(requiring court to appoint counsel from the mental health advocacy service); 405 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3-805(1) (2010) (giving preference to attorneys from the Guardianship and Mental
Health Advocacy Commission). The work of these attorneys cannot be overstated: on the whole,
they provide “top-flight legal representation to persons with mental disabilities in civil
commitment hearings.” Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33, at 941. Unfortunately,
as discussed infra, these attorneys represent but a fraction of those facing commitment. Id.
144. 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5-22(6) (2022).
145. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.100(3) (2021); W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4(h)(2) (2022) (requiring the
court to “appoint a competent attorney”).
146. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.100(3) (2021).
147. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.270(1) (2021) (not specifying qualifications of
appointed counsel); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.230(6) (2022) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2814(C) (2022) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-530 (2022) (same); ME. STAT. tit. 34-B, §
3864(5)(D) (2022) (same); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-212 (2022) (same); Perlin, Fatal Assumption,
supra note 140 (noting that the “the vast majority of lawyers who represent the disabled on
individual matters are appointed on individual bases” and not from specialized defender services).
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leaving courts unencumbered to appoint any available attorney.148
Those appointed attorneys “almost never measure up to the
appropriate ethical or constitutional standards for such
representation.”149
Second, states vary significantly in terms of when counsel must be
appointed. Most states require that an attorney be appointed at the
time—or shortly after—the hospital files a commitment petition.150
Other states require counsel be appointed only at the preliminary
hearing stage.151 And still others do not specify when the appointment
must be made.152 For example, Utah requires only that “an
opportunity to be represented by counsel” be provided at some point
“[b]efore the hearing.”153 Similarly, Maryland merely requires that
individuals in Mallory’s position be advised of “[t]he availability of the
services of the legal aid bureaus, lawyer referral services, and other
agencies that exist for the referral of individuals who need legal
counsel.”154 While Maryland requires the hospital to notify the local
public defender, the statute is silent as to when representation
begins.155 And while Indiana acknowledges the right to counsel, the
statute fails to explain how or when someone may exercise that right.156
Thus, while states universally recognize a respondent’s right to counsel,
states often fail to enshrine that right with sufficient procedural
protections.
Finally, states diverge in the duties they assign to appointed
counsel. Most civil commitment statutes require only that the state

148. See Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 140.
149. Id.
150. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 66-329(7) (2022) (“[T]he court shall appoint counsel . . . no later
than the time the application [for commitment] is received by the court.”); MINN. STAT.
§ 253B.07(2c) (2022) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-107(5) (2022) (same); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.230(6) (2022) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-13(2) (2003) (requiring appointment
within twenty-four hours from time petition was filed); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 574.003(a) (2022) (same).
151. E.g., 40.1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1.5-8(d) (2022).
152. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-60.4 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.270(1) (2021); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(14)(a) (West 2021); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-631(a)(3)
(West 2022).
153. UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(14)(a) (West 2021).
154. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 10-631(a)(3) (West 2022).
155. Id. § 10-631(a)(5).
156. See IND. CODE § 12-26-2-2 (2022).
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appoint counsel, without more.157 Outside of the context of civil
commitment, this makes sense: in most cases, attorneys need not be
told how to prepare and advocate for their clients. Moreover, attorneys
are bound by ethical rules to meet with their clients and zealously
advocate on their behalf.158 But in the unique context of civil
commitment, attorneys commonly assume that their clients are
“presumptively incompetent to enter into autonomous decisionmaking.”159 In this sense, an attorney may feel that they are better
equipped to decide what is in their client’s best interests, often
preventing the required zealous advocacy.160 Accordingly, a handful of
states set ground rules for any attorney preparing for and participating
in the civil commitment system.161 For example, Arizona requires that
appointed counsel meet with their clients within twenty-four hours of
appointment.162 And Minnesota demands that attorneys representing
those facing civil commitment serve as “vigorous advocate[s] on behalf
of the person.”163 With this language, Minnesota makes clear that an
attorney’s ethical obligation to zealously advocate applies even in civil
commitment proceedings.164
Ultimately, while all states acknowledge that individuals in civil
commitment proceedings are entitled to counsel, who counsel is, when
counsel is appointed, and the duties of representation vary
significantly.
157. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 433A.270(1) (2021) (not specifying duties of counsel);
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.230(6) (2022) (same); VA. CODE § 37.2-814(C) (2022) (same); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-17-530 (2022) (same); ME. STAT. tit. 34-B, § 3864(5)(D) (2022) (same); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-47-212 (2022) (same).
158. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). Every
state has adopted a version of the ABA Model Rules. See, e.g., Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions
Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_mo
del_rules [https://perma.cc/5KE6-VQVZ], (last updated Mar. 28, 2018).
159. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, Said I, but You Have No Choice: Why a
Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client’s Decision About Mental Health Treatment Even if It Is Not
What S/He Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 73, 95 (2016).
160. See infra notes 193–196 and accompanying text.
161. MO. REV. STAT. § 632.450 (2022); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-537 (2022); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 330.1454 (2022).
162. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-537 (2022).
163. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(2c)(4) (2022).
164. Eric S. Janus & Richard M. Wolfson, The Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982 Summary
and Analysis, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 41, 57 (1983) (“The Act makes clear that, as in other
proceedings, counsel should take his instructions from his client, and advocate vigorously within
ethical bounds for that position.”).
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III. THE FLAWS IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURE
Building on the discussion of commitment procedure across the
states in Part II, this Part focuses on three specific flaws: states’ failure
to provide a prompt hearing for those facing civil commitment, the
absence of clear statutory standards for the role of counsel in
commitment hearings, and the lack of compliance with the law in the
commitment system. Taken together, these flaws explain how
commitment proceedings often take place in “pitch darkness”165 and
inform the need for the statutory reforms proposed in Part IV.
A. Time to Hearing
Nearly fifty years ago, scholars believed the primary procedural
issue in emergency detention was “the length of time the individual
may justifiably be detained before the state’s emergency power
expires” and a hearing must be held.166 Little has changed: many of the
laws that authorize prolonged periods of emergency detention have
been on the books for decades. For example, New York does not
require a hearing as of right167 and has not altered its procedures for
emergency civil commitment since 1986.168 Maryland’s law—the law
that allowed Mallory to wait ten days for a hearing—was last modified
in 1990.169 Likewise, South Carolina’s law letting respondents wait
fifteen days has been on the books since 1991.170
But since these laws were enacted, doctors have greatly improved
their understanding of serious mental illnesses and how to treat them.
As a result, the average length of inpatient hospitalization has declined
substantially.171 In 1990, a patient experiencing serious mental illness
would spend weeks or even months receiving inpatient treatment.172

165. Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33, at 939.
166. Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1265–66 (1974) [hereinafter Developments].
167. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.39(a) (McKinney 1985).
168. See 1985 N.Y. Laws 3115 (showing the most recent changes to New York’s commitment
scheme).
169. See 1990 Md. Laws 490 (amending the statute to its current ten-day limit).
170. See 1991 S.C. Acts 30 (enacting current fifteen-day hearing regime).
171. Richard C. Boldt, Emergency Detention and Involuntary Hospitalization: Assessing the
Front End of the Civil Commitment Process, 10 DREXEL L. REV. 1, 19 (2017).
172. Mark L. Ruffalo, The Dire State of Inpatient Mental Health, PSYCH. TODAY (June 25,
2019), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/freud-fluoxetine/201906/the-dire-state-inpat
ient-mental-health [https://perma.cc/YZ8H-2Z5Y]; see also Olufemi Babalola, Vahdet Gormez,
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Today, that same patient is rarely hospitalized for more than a week.173
Nevertheless, laws that allow states to wait weeks before any judicial
intervention remain stagnant.
For its part, the U.S. Supreme Court has provided little reason for
change. The Court has failed to specify a “clear constitutional rule
either requiring the preliminary judicial review of emergency
psychiatric detentions or setting an absolute time limit on the period
between the commencement of custody and a full adjudicatory
hearing.”174 In fact, the Court summarily affirmed a civil commitment
scheme that tolerated a forty-five day wait for a hearing.175
But for those facing civil commitment, prompt hearings are
crucial.176 As Professor Tom Tyler explains, procedural justice requires
participation: “People value the opportunity to present their
arguments and state their views even when they indicate that what they
say is having little or no influence over the third-party authority.”177
Individuals with mental illness are no different. Research indicates that
people experiencing serious mental illness, like anyone else, value
participation and can recognize its absence.178 A judicial hearing is,
perhaps, respondents’ only chance to have their voices heard on the
issue of their liberty. The American Psychiatric Association
emphasizes that these hearings should occur promptly.179 Similarly, the
National Center for State Courts calls on states to “involve
respondents in commitment proceedings to the greatest extent and as

Nisreen A. Alwan, Paul Johnstone & Stephanie Sampson, Length of Hospitalisation for People
with Severe Mental Illness, 1 COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMATIC REVS., art. no. CD000384,
2014, at 1 (“In high-income countries, over the last three decades, the length of hospital stays for
people with serious mental illness has reduced drastically.”).
173. Ruffalo, supra note 172.
174. Boldt, supra note 171, at 18.
175. Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911, 911 (1973), aff’g Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265 (D.
Conn. 1972).
176. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 478.
177. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for
Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 440 (1992).
178. Cascardi, Poythress & Hall, supra note 47, at 738.
179. AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT ON VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
HOSPITALIZATION OF ADULTS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2020) (“Persons subject to involuntary
hospitalization are entitled to representation by an attorney and a prompt hearing before an
administrative law or judicial officer.”); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of
Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 169 (2011) (noting that litigation
delays “may be interpreted as frustrating the voice of the individual litigants”).
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early as possible.”180 States may lessen some of the harms inherent in
involuntary commitment by providing a meaningful, prompt hearing.
B. Attorney Representation
While all states provide for the assistance of counsel in civil
commitment hearings, this guarantee is often hollow in practice. As
explained in Part II.C, states often fail to ensure that attorneys in civil
commitment proceedings have sufficient knowledge and experience in
mental health and disability law.181 And beyond substantive
knowledge, attorneys often lack the training to know how best to
interact with their clients—individuals suffering from serious mental
illness.182 Further, many states do not specify at what point in a civil
commitment proceeding an attorney must be appointed.183 And states
have largely failed to clarify the role that attorneys must take within
the hearing itself,184 paving the way for attorneys to refrain from the
zealous advocacy associated with adversarial proceedings.
Building on Part II.C, this Section highlights the reality of attorney
performance in commitment hearings to reveal deep procedural
problems. At hearings, attorneys often act in a “passive,
nonadversarial, or perfunctory manner[].”185 While there are attorneys
who take their work seriously,186 attorneys often come to hearings
unprepared and ready to “accept at face value the conclusions of
psychiatric experts without even the slightest degree of skepticism.”187
Attorneys frequently call no witnesses188 and do not seek an
independent psychiatric evaluation.189 Still more troublesome, some

180. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 479 (emphasis added).
181. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 465 (“[A]dequate representation of
respondents [in commitment proceedings] requires access to information and expertise that most
attorneys do not have.”).
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 157 and accompanying text; Developments, supra note 166, at 1288
(“[S]tatutes generally do not clarify the function which defending counsel is to perform.”).
185. Brooks, supra note 34, at 287.
186. John Q. La Fond & Mary L. Durham, Cognitive Dissonance: Have Insanity Defense and
Civil
Commitment Reforms Made a Difference, 39 VILL. L. REV. 71, 113 (1994); see also supra note 143.
187. Brooks, supra note 34.
188. Id. at 288.
189. Id. at 289.
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judges may encourage this behavior.190 Judges have been known to
“discourage zealous advocacy,”191 forcing the few attorneys willing to
advocate to limit themselves only to the arguments “they believe[d]
judges [would] tolerate.”192
Even if statutes demand it, attorneys struggle to adopt the role of
a zealous advocate.193 Attorneys often act paternalistically towards
their clients, “assum[ing] their mentally ill clients do not know what is
best for them.”194 Even when clients unequivocally express a desire for
continued liberty, their attorneys still may not believe them.195 Rather,
the attorney may believe that “relaxed advocacy will best serve [the]
client’s interests.”196 In those cases, attorneys function less like
advocates and more like clerks, simply reviewing “the paperwork to
make sure it is in order, thus giv[ing] the false impression that the client
has had the benefit of legal representation.”197 As a result, hearings
often start and end in a matter of minutes.198
From a procedural justice perspective, respondents have an
interest in an adversarial proceeding where their attorneys represent
190. Id. at 288 (noting “instances of vigorous cross-examination often generate hostility
from . . . judges”).
191. Id.; see also Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 42 (1999) [hereinafter Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence] (“Judges often discourage attorneys from taking an active part in the hearing or
themselves take over the role of questioning witnesses.”); Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra
note 33, at 942 n.27 (recounting one attorney’s recent experience with “judges who would give
more time to petitioner’s side and less time to [respondent],” reaching the point where this
attorney “would start timing how long petitioner’s attorney got to ask questions so that [the
attorney] could say [their] cross should be allowed to be at least that long”).
192. Brooks, supra note 34, at 288.
193. La Fond & Durham, supra note 186.
194. Id. at 114; see also Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 159, at 76–77 (2016) (“A model of
‘paternalism/best interests’ is regularly substituted for a traditional legal advocacy position, and
this substitution is rarely questioned.”). Crucially, appointed attorneys do not (and should not)
act as guardian ad litems. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-419 (2021). Appointed by the court, a
guardian ad litem acts as “an independent advocate who promotes the best interests of minors,
elders, and legally incompetent persons.” Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F.
Freitas, Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
43, 43 (2011).
195. Developments, supra note 166, at 1290.
196. Id.
197. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 191, at 43.
198. Professor Michael Perlin suggests a connection between adequate representation and
hearing time, noting that “where there is a dedicated state-wide program to provide
representation,” commitment hearings take substantially longer. Perlin, Who Will Judge the
Many, supra note 33, at 939 n.9.
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their desire for continued liberty and advocate zealously on their
behalf. Fundamentally, individuals perceive an adversarial process to
be more fair than an inquisitorial one199 and are more likely to be
satisfied with and accepting of the outcome.200 A minutes-long hearing
“give[s] many patients the impression that the hearing is an empty
ritual rather than a serious attempt to achieve accuracy and fairness.”201
Attorneys are the mouthpieces through which their clients speak; if
attorneys simply “roll over” during commitment hearings, their clients
are effectively silenced.202 In essence, respondents are robbed of their
ability to participate meaningfully in their hearings.
C. Noncompliance
Even in the few states with stronger procedural protections, “a
large gulf exists between the law on the books and the law in action.”203
Several studies have suggested that past statutory reforms have failed
“largely because the new statutory language is still broad enough to be
flexibly applied.”204 Indeed, “[t]he failure of civil commitment
procedures to meet statutory requirements is one of the more reliable
findings in the applied social sciences.”205 At bottom, any
improvements to states’ procedural protections have hardly made
these proceedings more accurate or fair.206
As a result, commitment proceedings are still happening in the
dark, with cases disposed of in a matter of minutes behind closed

199. Douglas S. Stransky, Civil Commitment and the Right To Refuse Treatment: Resolving
Disputes from a Due Process Perspective, 50 U. MIA. L. REV. 413, 441 (1996).
200. Id.
201. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 191, at 42. Professor Bruce Winick goes
on to explain that “from the patient’s perspective, the hearing may resemble the one presided
over by the Queen of Hearts in Alice in Wonderland, ‘Sentence first—verdict afterward.’” Id. at
43 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE
LOOKING-GLASS 113 (n.p., Hartsdale House 1865)).
202. See id. at 54 (“By effectuating, rather than compromising, the client’s participatory
interests in the commitment process, the attorney can contribute to the client’s sense that he or
she was treated fairly . . . .”).
203. Id. at 40.
204. SLOBOGIN, RAI & REISNER, supra note 10, at 706 & n.d (summarizing results of studies).
205. Eric Turkheimer & Charles D.H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice and Policy in Civil
Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCH. 646, 646 (1992).
206. La Fond & Durham, supra note 186; see also Paul S. Appelbaum, A History of Civil
Commitment and Related Reforms in the United States: Lessons for Today, 25 DEV. MENTAL
HEALTH L. 13, 19 (2006) (noting that “everybody involved in [the commitment] process has a
great deal more discretion than . . . it looks like on paper”).
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doors.207 The proceedings are often held at the detaining facility itself208
and limited to only necessary parties: attorneys, witnesses, and perhaps
a family member.209 To be sure, a closed hearing in the treating facility
offers certain benefits, such as privacy, familiarity, and avoiding
transport. But that privacy has a cost. The broader legal community—
and the public—have little insight into what happens at these
proceedings. No one is watching.
In sum, even when states provide procedural protections, they
often fail to meaningfully monitor these systems. Any proposal for
reform must be twofold: states must enhance their procedural
protections, and they must ensure compliance. Reform will only be
successful—that is, those going through civil commitment will only see
the benefits—if it changes how the law is applied in practice. Part IV
proposes three statutory reforms aimed at solving both problems.
IV. REFORMING THE LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPLIANCE
Part III highlighted three flaws in states’ current civil commitment
processes. This Part proposes some solutions, drawing inspiration from
states that provide procedural justice most effectively. First, Part IV.A
makes the case for holding probable cause hearings within seventy-two
hours of emergency detention, as New Hampshire does. Part IV.B
contends that states should explicitly define the role and duties of
counsel in their statutory schemes, drawing inspiration from Wyoming,
Arizona, and Minnesota. Then, Part IV.C tackles the issue of
compliance by proposing a statutorily mandated mental health board
to monitor commitment proceedings.
At the outset, it bears explaining why this Note advocates for
statutory reform. In 1984, when the National Center for State Courts
published its Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, the
authors agreed that they need not resort to statutory reform: “Much
good can be accomplished through less controversial changes in
practice that require no new laws.”210 Statutory reform can be
cumbersome and clunky.211 Reform often requires enormous efforts
from politicians, advocacy groups, and concerned citizens. To see
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33, at 939.
See supra note 136.
See supra note 135.
State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 416.
Id. at 409.

LEDERER IN FINAL PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

2023]

12/16/2022 10:47 AM

NOT SO CIVIL COMMITMENT

931

nationwide change, this process must be repeated in each state. And as
discussed above, statutory reform to commitment procedure often fails
to produce its desired result.212 Why, then, is statutory reform the
solution when it might not even change the status quo? Put simply,
statutory reform is necessary but not sufficient to reform the civil
commitment process. As one advocacy group explained, “the right laws
provide a necessary foundation that states can use to build systems that
promote a successful continuum of care and better outcomes.”213 While
“fixing civil commitment laws represent[s] only a first step, . . . it is an
essential one.”214
This Note advances three specific, targeted statutory reforms. In
doing so, this Note seeks to shine a renewed light on commitment
procedure in the hopes of enhancing procedural justice for those
experiencing civil commitment and rekindling a conversation about
how states treat those experiencing serious mental illness.
A. A Probable Cause Hearing Within Seventy-Two Hours
To increase procedural justice, states should provide those facing
civil commitment with a timely hearing. Specifically, states should hold
a probable cause hearing within seventy-two hours of an individual’s
initial confinement. New Hampshire’s law offers a model. New
Hampshire provides that “[w]ithin 3 days after an involuntary
emergency admission, . . . there shall be a probable cause
hearing . . . to determine if there was probable cause for involuntary
emergency admission.”215 At the hearing, the state bears the burden of
showing that the commitment had probable cause.216 That is, the state
must show there is probable cause to believe the respondent meets the
state’s criteria for involuntary commitment.217 Should the court find
probable cause, the detention continues for a maximum of ten days.218

212. See supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text.
213. New Report Card, supra note 50.
214. GRADING THE STATES, supra note 93, at 8.
215. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31(I) (2010).
216. Id.
217. Id.; see also Developments, supra note 166, at 1276 (“[T]he court in a preliminary hearing
would quickly determine [if there was] probable cause to believe the individual falls within the
statutory standards for commitment.”).
218. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:32 (2010).
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To continue detention beyond those ten days, the state must petition
the court for a full hearing on the merits of the commitment.219
In a dual hearing regime like New Hampshire’s, a probable cause
hearing need not provide individuals with the array of rights that a full
hearing entails. Certainly, an individual should be present and
represented by counsel. But the hearing may be informal; as long as
the presiding officer “engage[s] in dialogue with the parties,”220
procedural justice will be increased.221 Individuals must be afforded the
chance to interact with and participate in the system that detains them.
This way, at a minimum, as the court weighs the possibility of
temporarily stripping them of their liberty, respondents may feel the
process was fair.222
Seventy-two hours is an appropriate amount of time to allow
doctors to provide emergency treatment and attorneys to prepare. The
Treatment Advocacy Center, a mental health advocacy group
dedicated to increasing access to treatment, recognizes that seventytwo hours is “the shortest amount of time realistically needed to
stabilize the patient and, if the individual is not admitted, to discharge
them with a long-term care plan.”223 Likewise, the National Center for
State Courts agrees that a three-day period provides “a good balance
between the need to curtail unwarranted actions taken against the
respondent and the need for sufficient time to permit the parties to
prepare themselves and present their cases.”224 A seventy-two hour
window properly balances the divergent interests of respondents and
the state. On the one hand, respondents generally desire immediate
judicial intervention. But in an emergency context, a pre-detention or
219. Id.
220. See Stromberg & Stone, supra note 48, at 324 (advocating for probable cause hearing
within five days of patient’s admission to allow the court to “engage in dialogue with the parties”).
221. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 26, 28
(2007) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Justice] (noting research suggests that “disputants view[]
adversary procedures as fair because they allow[] people the opportunity to tell their side of the
story before decisions [are] made”).
222. Of course, respondents may waive their right to this hearing should they wish. New
Hampshire continues to serve as a model. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:31(III) (2010). But
absent waiver, the hearing should be held as scheduled.
223. GRADING THE STATES, supra note 93, at 15. Accord Nathaniel P. Morris, Reasonable or
Random: 72-Hour Limits to Psychiatric Holds, 72 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 210, 211 (2021)
(recognizing that “many patients with psychiatric needs can be evaluated, stabilized, and
discharged within 72 hours, although some relevant studies are outdated or have methodological
limitations”).
224. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 480.
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immediate hearing is not feasible; individuals like Mallory often
require immediate treatment. On the other hand, the state has various
interests in a delayed hearing.
Generally, states argue that hospitals need time to gather evidence
and build a factual record to show that commitment is necessary.225
However, a probable cause hearing poses a lower hurdle than the clearand-convincing standard that states must meet at the full merits
hearing.226 Going further, some may suggest that a delay benefits the
respondent.227 Specifically, a delayed hearing may provide a longer
window for treatment, thus obviating the need for commitment. But
this argument assumes the conclusion to be drawn at the hearing.228 At
this point, the state has not made any showing that continued treatment
is warranted. In any event, a respondent, through counsel, may request
a continuance or waive the hearing altogether. Finally, states may
object that providing a hearing within seventy-two hours is costly and
unduly burdensome. To be sure, judicial systems across the country
desperately need additional funding.229 But a lack of funding should not
be the reason that those facing civil commitment are denied the
procedural justice they deserve. And tellingly, several states do require
hearings within a seventy-two-hour window.230
States that hold hearings merely upon request—or only after a
significant delay—do not realize these procedural benefits. By forcing
respondents to request hearings, states inherently place an obstacle
between the respondent and the court. For example, in Colorado, an
individual may only receive a hearing if their attorney files a request.231
To accomplish this, the respondent must identify and locate their
225. Developments, supra note 166, at 1275–76.
226. See id. (comparing probable cause hearings in commitment proceedings to those held in
the criminal context). In 1986, the National Center for State Courts also suggested states hold a
hearing within seventy-two hours. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 480. However, the
Center called for a full hearing on the merits within three days, rather than a probable cause
hearing. Id. By contrast, this Note recommends only that states hold a probable cause hearing
within three days, thus alleviating the fact-finding pressure on the state to build a case so soon.
227. Developments, supra note 166, at 1277.
228. Id. at 1278 (“Unless the state shows that the standards are met, it is not justified in
assuming that [commitment] is conferring a benefit.”).
229. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court
Funding Crisis, 143 DÆDALUS 96, 96 (2014) (evaluating various proposals to address the “serious
funding reductions” state courts face).
230. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (listing states that provide for hearings within
seventy-two hours).
231. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-65-107(6) (2022).
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appointed counsel and then coordinate the submission of a written
request, all while confined in a psychiatric unit. Even if a respondent
manages to jump through these hoops, Colorado merely promises a
hearing within ten days of the request.232 As discussed in Part III.A, it
is “of paramount importance to the individual” to receive a “prompt
disposition” of their case.233
Similarly, states that simply review for probable cause without
holding a hearing do not increase procedural justice. To be sure, this is
a positive step: this layer of judicial review can help ensure that those
filing commitment applications are not abusing the system. But this
structure lacks the procedural benefits of a probable cause hearing.
When a judge or officer simply reviews a petition for probable cause,
the respondent has no opportunity to participate in the process that
seeks to detain them. In this scenario, respondents have no reason to
believe a judicial authority has heard their case, let alone their voice.
In sum, states should require probable cause hearings within seventytwo hours of confinement to balance any state interest with the
respondent’s interest in procedural justice.
B. Attorneys’ Duties Should Be Defined by Statute
Over the last fifty years, scholars have repeatedly identified the
failings of attorneys in commitment practice234 and made calls for
reform.235 Unfortunately, little has changed.236 This Note echoes these
calls and proposes that states statutorily enumerate the role and duties
of counsel. Individuals in civil commitment proceedings, like any other
litigant, participate through their attorneys. Indeed, “attorney[s]
232. Id.
233. Developments, supra note 166, at 1275–76.
234. See Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 140, at 39 (identifying myriad problems with the
role of counsel); Thomas R. Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceedings:
Emerging Problems, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 816, 817 (1974) (calling the right to counsel in commitment
proceedings “an empty one”); DAVID B. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 98
(1981) (noting counsel’s failure to investigate “even the most elementary legal questions”);
Virginia Aldigé Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. REV.
1027, 1030 (1982) (summarizing studies showing poor attorney performance).
235. See Coleman & Shellow, supra note 75, at 60–65 (proposing a new model to evaluate
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the civil commitment context); State Courts Guidelines,
supra note 48, at 464–77 (suggesting guidelines to define the role of counsel and their duties).
236. See Perlin, Who Will Judge the Many, supra note 33 (noting that critiques of the
commitment system have gone uncontradicted); Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 140, at 42
(“While there has been some episodic evidence of bar development . . . the overall picture is little
better than it was in 1978 . . . .”).
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stand[] up for someone who has no one else to stand up for him or her,
and who may be ill equipped to do so personally.”237 Individuals with
mental illness and with little access to the outside world are perhaps
more reliant on their attorneys than any other client.238 If attorneys fail
to advocate, these individuals are effectively silenced. By clarifying the
role of counsel in the following four ways, states can increase the
procedural justice afforded to those experiencing civil commitment.
First, states should specify when counsel must be appointed in the
timeline of commitment proceedings, particularly those proceedings
that arise in the emergency context. Courts should appoint counsel as
soon as a probable cause hearing is scheduled so that the attorney may
diligently prepare. Wyoming serves as a guide. In Wyoming, the court
must appoint an attorney as soon as “continued detention is sought”
for anyone detained under emergency circumstances.239 That is,
Wyoming requires an attorney be appointed when the period of
emergency detention is running out but the state has filed a petition for
continued confinement.
Early appointment is crucial so that attorneys may effectively
prepare for a hearing. When lawyers have little more than hours to
prepare for a hearing—a hearing that may “sever or infringe upon the
individual’s relations with family, friends, physicians, and employment
for three months or longer”—the legal system “has seemingly lost its
way.”240 Notably, Wyoming is one of the few states to require a
preliminary hearing within three days,241 demonstrating that it is
possible to both hold probable cause hearings within seventy-two
hours and appoint counsel in time for these hearings.
Second, states should require counsel to perform basic
preparatory work before any hearing, as Arizona does. Arizona assigns
attorneys certain “minimal duties” as they prepare for commitment
hearings.242 Most importantly, these duties include meeting with the
client within twenty-four hours of appointment.243 From a procedural
237. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 466.
238. See Litwack, supra note 234, at 830 (noting clients are sometimes “too passive,
frightened, or heavily medicated to articulate their wishes forcefully”).
239. WYO. STAT. § 25-10-109(h) (2022).
240. Coleman & Shellow, supra note 75, at 52 (quoting In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d
485, 492–93 (Mont. 2001)).
241. WYO. STAT. § 25-10-109(h) (2022).
242. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-537(B) (2022).
243. Id.
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justice perspective, this meeting is key as it involves the respondent in
the commitment process before the hearing itself. Procedural justice is
not confined to direct interaction with the judicial system.244 Rather,
individuals associate even peripheral interactions with their
perceptions of procedural fairness—including their out-of-court
interactions with their own lawyers.245 Without any prehearing
meeting, “the respondent’s brief time in court becomes the practical
beginning and end of any safeguarding of his or her interests by the
legal system.”246
Specificity will help resolve ambiguity regarding the expectations
of counsel—for attorneys, judges, and any monitoring body.247 Arizona
continues to serve as a model here, requiring attorneys to complete
certain preparatory work. Specifically, Arizona tasks attorneys with
reviewing the client’s records at least twenty-four hours before a
hearing, interviewing relevant medical personnel, and investigating
any alternatives to involuntary inpatient treatment.248 Compared to
statutes written only in broad terms, statutes that explicitly enumerate
key duties will help monitoring boards to identify situations where
attorneys fail to adequately represent their clients.
Third, states should adopt statutory language that clarifies the role
respondents’ counsel should play during commitment hearings, as
Minnesota has. Minnesota’s civil commitment law requires counsel to
act as “vigorous advocate[s]” on behalf of their clients.249 By including
this language in the statute, attorneys can no longer question whether
the zealous advocate standard required by ethical rules applies in the
civil commitment setting.250 To be sure, attorney-client communication
244. Tyler, Procedural Justice, supra note 221, at 30 (“Studies suggest that people are
influenced by their treatment at all stages of their experience, and by all the authorities whom
they encounter.”).
245. Id.
246. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 504–05.
247. See Note, The Role of Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical
Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540, 1543 (1975) (noting statutes that merely call for counsel’s
appointment do not provide guidance on their role).
248. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-537(B) (2022).
249. MINN. STAT. § 253B.07(2c)(4) (2022).
250. Coleman & Shellow, supra note 75, at 55 (“[T]he job of these particular attorneys
sometimes seems ambiguous.”); Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who from What, and Why, and
How?: A Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53,
96 (2004) (“[R]ole definition would serve to resolve the confusion between the role of attorney
as advocate for respondent’s position, and as guardian ad litem, advocating for the best interests
of respondent as perceived by the attorney.”).
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may be strained and client reasoning may not be clear or logical. But
while they may be experiencing mental illness, clients—and not their
attorneys—are entitled to decide what is in their own best interests.251
Ultimately, unambiguous statutory language may help alleviate
the pressure some attorneys feel to act paternalistically towards their
clients and limit their advocacy. And codifying this duty elevates it
from a mere ethical precept to a statutory requirement, hopefully
drawing increased recognition and respect from practitioners. In sum,
states should clearly set out the role and duties of counsel so that
attorneys understand what is expected of them and allow the state to
monitor compliance.
Finally, states should amend their statutes to give explicit
preference to attorneys with experience and training in representing
and advocating for individuals with mental illness. With only seventytwo hours before a probable cause hearing, attorneys without prior
experience would have little time to become comfortable serving
clients who are experiencing serious mental illness.252 At a minimum,
attorneys must learn how best to communicate with their clients.
Training sessions and materials can give attorneys tools to overcome
these barriers and better navigate working with clients whose illnesses
might impede their ability to communicate.253 By preferencing
experienced attorneys, states would increase the procedural justice
that respondents receive in the commitment process.

251. See Coleman & Shellow, supra note 75, at 55–56 (discussing how attorneys may act
paternalistically, assuming erroneously that the client is not competent to make decisions for
themself).
252. Imposing this duty is simply the first step. States should go further and provide the
education necessary to allow attorneys to meet these statutory standards. Of course, providing
education and resources (like continuing legal education classes) requires increased funding and
attention to the mental health system. Both the public defender and the mental health systems
are chronically underfunded. See NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE MENTAL HEALTH
CUTS: A NATIONAL CRISIS 1 (2011) (detailing cuts to the mental healthcare system); Mary Sue
Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: Still a National Crisis?, 86 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1564, 1574–75 (2018) (discussing the effects of underfunding public defense). This
Note is not blind to these barriers. Rather, this Note highlights the flawed commitment system in
the hope of drawing increased attention from students, scholars, and state legislators alike.
253. Judith L. Kornegay, Working with Clients, in NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL COMMITMENT
MANUAL app. c at 6–8 (2d ed. 2011).
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C. Mental Health Boards as Monitors
Empirical
research
has
“virtually
unanimous[ly] . . .
demonstrate[ed] that attorneys, judges, and clinical examiners do not
perform in a manner consistent with revised commitment standards
and procedures.”254 In short, reforms without a compliance mechanism
are often empty promises. This Note aims to ameliorate the compliance
problem by proposing that states use preexisting community-based
mental health boards to oversee the commitment process. Indeed,
every state already has a mental health board in place.255 Thus, states
need only expand the boards’ duties to include a monitoring function.
Is the state holding hearings within the required period of time? Are
attorneys meeting with their clients as they prepare for hearings? How
are attorneys advocating within the hearings? With a board in place,
states—and the public—may begin to monitor these systems.
The board should be a tool to involve stakeholders from the
mental health community in the civil commitment process. Specifically,
the board should include representatives from the state agencies that
oversee the public mental health system as well as members of mental
health advocacy groups. Perhaps most importantly, the board should
include those who have experienced commitment themselves or family
members who have experienced the civil commitment of a loved one.
Fundamentally, “improvement of the involuntary civil commitment
process is not just a professional concern.”256 Rather, it should concern
the average citizen, as part of the “broad public debate about the most
appropriate response to the needs of people with mental illness.”257
The board need not impose substantial burdens on its members.
Every board member does not need to receive real-time updates every
time someone is detained within the state. Instead, the board should
construct a monitoring system that provides insight into commitment
proceedings in practice, with the goal of conforming practice to law. As
one example, the board could send one member to observe a small
number of commitment proceedings across the state every month, at
random and unannounced times. Then, this member can present their

254. Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 205 (citation omitted).
255. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Block Grants, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/block-grants [https://perma.cc/5ZVVCYNW], (last updated June 14, 2022).
256. State Courts Guidelines, supra note 48, at 417.
257. Id.
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findings to the rest of the board at a quarterly meeting. This would
provide valuable insight for the board, and the presence of an observer
alone could increase compliance with statutory requirements.258
Importantly, this proposal is not out of reach, and states need not
start from scratch. Indeed, the federal government has long insisted on
mental health review boards. For example, to receive a federal grant
for community mental health services, the receiving state must create
and maintain a state mental health board of stakeholders and
interested community members.259 Specifically, the board must
“monitor, review, and evaluate . . . the allocation and adequacy of
mental health services within the [s]tate.”260
Some states have assigned these boards additional duties above
and beyond what the federal government requires.261 For example,
Wisconsin’s Council on Mental Health explains that its mission
includes “creat[ing] partnerships that develop, coordinate, and provide
a full range of mental health resources” and “eradicat[ing] stigma and
discrimination” in mental health services within the state.262 States
should use these boards as an opportunity to monitor the state’s
compliance with civil commitment procedure. States should
specifically codify this duty as part of the board’s overall evaluation of
the state’s mental health services. Hopefully, this increased monitoring
will bring civil commitment hearings into compliance with the laws that
govern them.

258. Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 205, at 651 (“Encouraging attendance of hospital staff,
patient advocates, CMHC representatives, and members of patients’ families would be one way
to enhance accountability and public confidence.”).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-3(a), (c)(1).
260. Id. § 300x-3(b)(3).
261. See, e.g., WCMH: About the Wisconsin Council on Mental Health, WIS. DEP’T OF
HEALTH SERVS. (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/wcmh/aboutus.htm#background
[https://perma.cc/VS9F-SPCU] (listing duties of the council); Behavioral Health Advisory
Council, MD. MANUAL ON-LINE (Mar. 30, 2022), https://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/
26excom/html/04behav.html [https://perma.cc/KE4U-DTYA] (same); Idaho Behavioral Health
Planning Council (BHPC), IDAHO DEP’T OF HEALTH & WELFARE, https://healthand
welfare.idaho.gov/about-dhw/boards-councils-committees/idaho-behavioral-health-planningcouncil-bhpc [https://perma.cc/T5ZA-XQ7B] (same); Governor’s Behavioral Health Servs. Planning
Council: Expectations for All Council and Subcommittee Members, KAN. DEP’T FOR AGING &
DISABILITY SERVS., https://kdads.ks.gov/docs/librariesprovider17/csp/bhs-documents/gbhspc/
expectations-for-council-and-subcommittee-members.pdf?sfvrsn=49a629ee_0 [https://perma.cc/
X4PC-YLFD] (same); State Advisory Council, MO. DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH, https://
dmh.mo.gov/alcohol-drug/state-advisory-council [https://perma.cc/5AR5-Z33L] (same).
262. See WCMH: About the Wisconsin Council on Mental Health, supra note 261 (listing the
mission statement of the council).
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CONCLUSION
This Note surveys existing civil commitment procedure across the
United States to call attention to its flaws. Current statutory regimes
subject individuals like Mallory to protracted periods of confinement
with little to no judicial intervention. And when hearings do take place,
they often happen behind closed doors in a matter of minutes,
compounding the harms of an already stigmatizing process. This Note
proposes three statutory reforms to increase procedural justice for
those facing civil commitment. First, states should hold probable cause
hearings within seventy-two hours of any confinement period. Second,
states should clearly delineate the role and duties of counsel in
commitment hearings. Third, states should use preexisting mental
health boards to monitor the civil commitment system and increase
compliance with statutory requirements. For the last fifty years, civil
commitment has been litigated in pitch darkness. It is time to move
these proceedings into the light.

